David Hathaway[1],
September 1996
Life has been evolving for millions
of years on our planet. Human races, which appeared quite recently in the
course of evolution of countless forms of life and ecosystems, like any other
species depend entirely on their physical, energetic and biological
surroundings.
We perceive, order and classify the
components of the environment in line with our own particular needs. Just as
our environment takes on a diversity of forms and expressions, humanity itself
has also diversified into differentiated cultures and classes, each with its own
peculiar manner of perceiving and relating to the rest of the world.
Our knowledge of nature has in fact
progressed along the roads chosen by those who sustain scientific research
(whatever form that activity may take in different cultures, classes or
historical periods), and therefore what we actually know about nature depends
on what we wish to know. Interpretations of nature arise out of particular
relationships man has established with it. Fortunately, considering so many
poorly-informed interpretations and veritable disasters caused by some of these
relations with the environment, humanity has also diversified (not unlike the
world it is part of) and does not think with a single mind.
Biodiversity is a relatively new
angle in interpretations of nature. It refers to a virtue of groups of living
things in ecosystems: their tendency to diversify into many species as well as
into many varieties, races, breeds, etc. of a single species. This biological
diversification and diversity is absolutely essential for the defense,
evolution and sustainability of all forms of life which live together in
communities and feed off of each other in ecosystems around the world.
Biodiversity, as vital as it is for
ecosystems, is of course nothing new. What is new is modern society's growing
awareness of its importance. This awareness, however, did not fall from the
sky, nor was it born spontaneously out of scientific research. Science has long
been aware of the interdependence amongst different species and of the
importance to them of diversification. But only recently have
environmentalists, official agencies and even major transnational corporations
begun promoting campaigns and even international conventions to defend it.
Why so much talk about biodiversity
all of a sudden? Two recent developments have been important. In the first
place, not only scientists and ecologists, but economists too, have realized
that nature is not an inexhaustible resource at man's service, and that uncontrolled
consumption of resources provided by our natural endowment is actually a kind
of self‑consumption. Special
efforts should therefore be undertaken to protect major areas at risk. In this
sense, there has been greater concern with the preservation of animals and
plants as such, as biological resources.
Secondly, industry has perceived the
tremendous potential economic value of biological diversity itself, as it
exists in abundance amongst the millions of species still available in
untouched ecosystems, like most of the Amazon and what remains of the Atlantic
Forest. New biotechnologies, and in particular genetic engineering, have
revealed vast realms for world‑wide industrial applications of the
endless variety of microorganisms, plants and animals. This approach looks less
to the organisms themselves than to their genes: the information, instructions
or genetic programming coded into chromosomes of the plants, animals and
microorganisms that populate the ecosystems to be preserved.
Access to the genetic information
contained in the forests, the floodplains, the savannas and even semi‑arid
regions, however, depends on the survival of these ecosystems. Almost
overnight, forests have come to be worth more standing than cut down, and not
only for local communities but for some of the largest industrial conglomerates
in the world as well!
For example, what is at stake in
recent disputes over the Amazon, in simplified terms, is a conflict between
many millions of dollars per year in exports of hardwood, minerals and electric
energy (in the form of aluminum) by traditional industries which have been
devastating ecosystems for decades, versus untold billions of dollars
immobilized in the infinite, unknown genetic combinations present in the
forest. Therefore, the Amazon Forest—preserved intact—is now being valued by
certain corporate planners as a fixed asset to be conserved and appropriated by
21st‑Century high‑tech industries.
Thus, the potential economic value
of biodiversity as a genetic resource for the burgeoning global biochemical
industry has brought new, and mighty, allies for traditional conservationists
and idealistic ecologists in their no‑longer inglorious struggle to
defend threatened species and fight the devastation of natural resources. Yet
although there may be convergence in their political action for conservation,
there is still a diversity of interests amongst these allies.
For some, biodiversity should be
preserved because of its own intrinsic value, because it is a mainstay for life
on the planet and an endowment and potential resource for all of humanity. For
others, however, the main thing is to be able to prospect, appropriate and
exploit these resources—extracted in only small samples—for their own corporate
strategies, while leaving the forest, the savanna or the semi‑arid
brushlands standing and the ecosystems intact. Despite the provincial outcry of
groups which still defend more conventional (and environmentally destructive)
styles of development for the Amazon's resources, the most polemical issue
today should no longer be whether to
conserve (although little has actually been done), but rather for whom these resources should be
conserved.
These varying interpretations of
biodiversity's usefulness underlie current international debates on the
subject, particularly in UNCED's Agenda 21 (an environmental action plan for
governments) and in the Convention on Biological Diversity, negotiated by
governments under the aegis of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP).
Conservation is no longer an exclusive concern of conservationists.
While public opinion is becoming
more aware of biodiversity's environmental importance, few have perceived the
economic interests at stake. It was transnational biochemical conglomerates
like Ciba Geigy, Shell, Bayer, Rhone Poulenc (Rhodia in Brazil), Monsanto, Du
Pont, ICI and a few others that pushed the governments of rich countries to put
biodiversity on the agenda of environmental concerns and at international
negotiations. In fact today's debates on the issue have become part of the
official North‑South conflict and refer more to the transfer of
biotechnologies and restrictions on access to genetic resources than to the
nitty‑gritty of protecting natural ecosystems and biodiversity.
Yet humanity's fundamental causes
for concern over the state of biodiversity remain. While solutions still appear
to depend on the resolution of disputes over who will reap the economic
benefits and who will be able to use proprietary biotechnologies, our
ecosystems, species and biodiversity are still at risk and the situation is
heading downhill.
Since the human species' overriding
relationship with its environment has to do with the resources provided by
nature, our culture now refers to life and to biodiversity, respectively, in
terms of the two forms in which they are appropriated:
· "biological
resources"—plants and animals as such, gathered, harvested, raised or
hunted for food, clothing, medicine, lumber, industrial inputs, etc., and
· "genetic
resources"—the information contained in the genes of living beings which
can be manipulated through plant and animal breeding or, more directly, for
certain industrial applications which substitute nature's own processes of
production.
The main sources for either
biological or genetic resources are the same: complex and diversified
ecosystems. The maintenance of these ecosystems and of their biological
diversity is vital for the sustainable exploitation of both types of resources,
no matter who appropriates them.
The main concern with biological
resources has been with wild plants and animals, rather than farm crops,
livestock or animals bred in captivity, except as complementary components of
strategies for the conservation of specific species. But even in the way we
treat animals, this all‑so‑human way of seeing nothing more than
natural resources in other living things can reveal the crueler side of
mankind's alienation with regards to our natural environment and—all to
frequently—with regards to other human beings as well.
The situation of animals in Brazil
has hardly been surveyed or studied. Our Constitution and laws on fauna are
among the most advanced in the world, but they are rarely enforced. There is an
absence of authority and public opinion is largely unaware. The Brazilian
Environmental Institute, IBAMA, is the only enforcement agency, and even at
that only for wild animals. Yet it does not have a fraction of the funds,
personnel or equipment needed to carry out its gigantic mission.
Scientists at the Goeldi Museum in
Belém have estimated that, in the Amazon alone, hunters decimate more than 20
million animals per year. The situation is similar in other parts of the
country. There are plans to authorize "recreational" hunting, but if
IBAMA is unable to control the slaughter and traffic of wild animals on city
streets and squares, then clearly it is also unprepared to control hunting in
distant forests.
Under existing animal‑protection
laws, both hunting and trade in wild fauna are unbailable crimes, carrying
sentences of two to five years in prison. Yet Rio de Janeiro is known as the
world capital for the traffic and slaughter of wild animals. Domestic traffic
is carried out in more than 150 open‑air markets in various cities of the
State. It is estimated that 140,000 animals (90% of them ornamental or song
birds) are captured each month, mostly in the Northeast and Southeast of
Brazil, for sale in Rio de Janeiro alone, and that only 5% of these animals
survive.
In the Pantanal, domestic traffic is
not of major proportions, but international traffic is enormous, in the same
range of that in Rio de Janeiro. Two million alligators are slaughtered each
year, while birds (a pair of blue macaws can be sold for $30,000 in the US),
primates and other animals are smuggled by air through Paraguay, Bolivia,
Argentina, Uruguay and directly from Brazilian airports. There have been
denunciations that traffic in this region is also linked to the smuggling of
both drugs and gold.
The Amazon region is also one of the
world's major sources for traffic in animals. The main routes to the northern
hemisphere are by air through the Guyanas, Colombia, Peru and Brazilian
airports. Traffic in this region as well is connected to drugs, and organized
mafias are reported to operate on a large scale. Animals are also smuggled by
river to the Iquitos market in Peru and to the Ver‑o‑Peso market in
Belém.
Most of Brazil's animal traffic,
which victimizes an estimated 20 million animals per year, flows to markets in
Europe and North America. These importing countries, therefore, are largely
responsible for this attack on world biodiversity.
Statistics from North America reveal
that 70‑80% of the animals captured die either in the traps or during
transportation. One shipment to the State of Illinois in the United States
arrived with 12,000 dead birds, while a single Lufthansa flight carried another
5,541 dead birds. For each animal purchased alive, another 95 die.
As for fishing, there is a
considerable amount of legislation aimed at preserving species and protecting
the natural breeding areas of ictiological fauna, in order to guarantee
reproduction of the species and a stable fishing stock over time. Yet fisheries
suffer from the same lack of law enforcement, a responsibility of IBAMA,
violations of no‑fishing seasons, the use of predatory fishing
techniques, poaching of eggs, illegal marketing, etc. This often causes
significant impacts on ecosystems by hindering the normal development of
species.
These are the effects of human
actions aimed directly against animals. Yet many other activities such as the
clearing of forests and urban expansion have eliminated natural habitats of
wild animals, the most well‑known case perhaps being that of the golden‑faced
lion monkey which used to inhabit vast expanses of the Atlantic Forest. The
destruction of habitats which are stop‑overs for migratory birds, for
example along the State of Maranhão coastline, has also threatened species that
play key roles in ecosystems of many other regions of the world.
Polluting industries also kill off
or drive away birds and other animals, and have eliminated not only fish but
entire ecosystems. So‑called modern farming techniques which indiscriminately
spray huge volumes of pesticides—frequently from dusting planes—are another
constant threat to the fauna. Major farming regions in the South, for example,
no longer hear the singing of birds or the nightly choruses of frogs, both of
which used to be important in the natural control of insect pests. The
indiscriminate eradication of insects with insecticides, on the other hand,
eliminates both pests and their natural enemies. A vicious cycle is thus
established, demanding the use of greater volumes of even stronger poisons,
since the pest population springs back in the absence of natural enemies, which
have indeed been successfully eradicated by both pesticides and the elimination
of natural habitats.
The timber industry, in 1996, is
still carrying out large‑scale operations to extract valuable hardwood
both for export and for Brazilian furniture and construction industries. In
many cases, it works hand‑in‑hand with the clearing of virgin
forest lands carried out by small farmers and, above all, by large ranchers in
the Amazon region. Even when "selective" felling of native trees is
practiced, however, major damage is caused by the opening of secondary and
temporary roads, by the falling trees themselves and by the physical and
cultural invasion of areas occupied by indigenous communities.
The kind of reforestation carried
out by the steel, iron and paper‑and‑pulp industries in Brazil's
countryside is mostly a hoax, but even when it is implemented the results are
mainly monocultures of pine or eucalyptus. These may hold back land erosion
processes, but they contribute nothing to the recomposition of ecosystems or to
the resettling of areas by native species of fauna.
Brazil's forests and other
ecosystems as well are also an invaluable source of medicinal plants for many
human diseases. Pharmaceutical chemicals extracted from these plants have been
isolated, analyzed and marketed around the world. Scientists estimate that only
5% of the world's flora has been systematically studied to identify is
potential pharmaceutical value. Even so, a fourth of all medicines prescribed
by doctors in the world are now based on plant compounds. The 7,000 different
compounds now in use account for world‑wide sales of $40 billion dollars
per year. The destruction of forests has therefore contributed significantly
both to direct financial losses and to the deterioration of human health,
because the extinction of hundreds of thousands of plants means that they will
now never be studied by pharmacologists.
Other social and institutional
factors also block our access to the knowledge and use of valuable medicinal
plants. The screening and selection of medicinal plants is rarely a haphazard
process. Nearly always, the identification of potentially valuable plants is
the result of surveys of the knowledge of indigenous or other local
communities, who over centuries and many generations of applied research have
identified not only the plants but also their various applications, procedures
for preparation and even the appropriate doses and routes of administration for
each particular ailment. The traditional knowledge reaped from these peoples is
extremely valuable, and would be handsomely rewarded, had it been developed by
modern corporate research laboratories.
Global pharmaceutical companies are
patenting and monopolizing the manufacture and sale of those very drugs. Based
only on their efforts to isolate active ingredients and scale up their
industrial production, they are turning over billions of dollars a year, but
rarely does a cent go to the peoples who carried out all the initial selection
and basic research. This will affect us all, because these peoples are
beginning to open their eyes to this injustice and have begun shutting off
access to outsiders, in order to demand equal footing in these relationships.
Future progress in drugs based on medicinal plants may therefore depend on a
solution to this demand raised by traditional peoples for a say in the use of
(and a share in the profits from) their collective intellectual labor.
One extreme, but certainly not
uncommon, example of this situation is the case of a perennial plant known as Phyllanthus niruri Linn, or simply
phyllanthus, which contains compounds useful in the treatment of hepatitis B.
In 1985, phyllanthus was patented in the US and in 1986 throughout Europe, for
use against hepatitis B by the Fox Chase Cancer Center, located in
Philadelphia. The company's claim quotes ethnobotanical surveys published in
India mentioning several medical applications for the plant, but not its anti‑hepatitis
action, which it claims to have been its own patentable discovery.
It so happens, however, that
phyllanthus also exists in several regions of Brazil, and in the Amazon its
traditional use against various kinds of hepatitis was recognized by a publicly‑owned
pharmaceutical company, Far‑Manguinhos, which is part of the Oswaldo Cruz
Institute in Rio de Janeiro. Far‑Manguinhos had planned to begin
industrial production of a phyllanthus‑based drug precisely for that
application. Under Brazil's 1971 patent legislation, the production of
pharmaceutical products in Brazil cannot be limited by patents, but the
Brazilian government has now had a law approved by Congress (Law 9279, May 14,
1996), to have industrial property rights extended to this industry, in
response to direct pressures and explicit threats from the government of the
United States.
That US and European patent,
therefore, may be able to prevent Brazil from developing and disseminating
medicines based on its own native flora and traditional knowledge. The question
this raises is: why should we invest our limited financial and human resources
in the conservation of our biodiversity and biological resources, if their
exploitation and use can be denied to us by patents obtained in other
countries? Even if funds for this conservation are made available, who will
guarantee that we will be able to enjoy the fruits of our own natural
resources? There can be no doubt that we must conserve biodiversity for its own
intrinsic value, but who will reap the benefits of the biological resources it
contains?
Genetic variations within species
are one feature of living beings that allow them to evolve and adapt to their
environments. Thousands of years ago, human societies began studying and
developing methods to use this variability in the selective breeding of plants
and animals, to make them adapt not only to environments but also to human
needs. This was the beginning of the millenary labor—and art—of genetic
improvement of biological resources.
More than ten thousand years ago,
when man presumably shifted his lifestyle from hunting and gathering to
agriculture, societies began this process by domesticating and selecting
varieties of plants and breeds of animals to meet their food, clothing and
health needs. For a long period of time, these needs were met by a vast variety
of species. Seeds, therefore, have historically been a key production factor in
farming and, until recently, were always owned, produced, stored and traded by
farmers themselves.
In the 20th Century, agriculture has
undergone several major transformations, including radical changes in
technology. With the stated aim of eliminating hunger, genetically improved
"high‑yield varieties" were developed for a few of the world's
major crops. This process, known as the Green Revolution, was sponsored by
governments and large corporations in the wealthy countries of the North. Along
with its "miracle seeds" for corn, rice and wheat, the Green
Revolution ushered in a new style of farming, based on the intensive use of
chemical fertilizers, pesticides and machinery. With the support of an
International Agricultural Research System, as well as abundant subsidized
credit for farmers, high‑yield varieties and the technology they depend
on were widely spread throughout Third‑World countries.
One of the most significant aspects
of this process is that farmers lost most of their autonomy in the farming
process. They lost control over their seeds, for example, which became a market
good rather than a resource of their own. The other side of the coin is that a
veritable Green Revolution industry arose worldwide to produce and market the
seeds, fertilizers, machinery and pesticides imposed by this new style of
farming. These new markets were enhanced by the genetic characteristics
selected under modern plant breeding standards, which emphasize volume yields
over other virtues such as resistance to pests or to nutrient‑poor soil.
Such standards were held to be feasible because modern fertilizer and pesticide
industries were seen as capable of providing solutions to such problems.
Assessments of this modernization of
agriculture vary, depending on the eye of the beholder. World Bank reports
praise the gains in wheat and rice yields in the Third World due to use of
improved varieties. However the Asian Development Bank has stated that growth
in total rice production in Asian countries has fallen short of promised
levels. Setting aside disputes over statistics, there is consensus that the
main problem the Green Revolution set out to solve still persists: hunger in
the Third World has grown and these countries are much more dependent on food
imports today than they were before the Green Revolution.
As for biodiversity, the Green
Revolution initiated a violent process of genetic erosion. Traditional
varieties in the Third World gave way to monoculture export crops. Local
varieties, the fruit of centuries of labor in domestication and selection, were
replaced by high‑yield varieties containing much less genetic
variability. Genetic resources developed over generations (including
characteristics like nutritional value and tolerance to adverse environments,
neglected by industrial‑style breeding) were exchanged for the
homogeneity of Green Revolution varieties.
The fragility of this model was not
long in appearing. The new breeders themselves soon had to face a problem of
their own making, when they realized that their most basic raw material—the
genetic diversity present in local varieties or land races—was disappearing and
that the new improved varieties were very vulnerable to the onslaught of bad
weather, pests and blight and had to be substituted over very short periods of
time. As a result, they began concentrating on the collection of seed samples
of remaining "land‑race" varieties for major cash crops, to be
stored in refrigerated seed banks. In the 1970s, the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations sponsored the creation of the International Board for Plant Genetic
Resources (IBPGR) to help coordinate plant genetic resource collection and
introduction, in cooperation with the UN's FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organization).
The motives which led the agents of
this process of modernization to fund genetic resource preservation activities
were clearly much more of a business nature than due to any recognition of the
larger importance of conserving biodiversity.
The development of modern
biotechnologies has made biodiversity an even more valuable economic resource.
Techniques such as genetic engineering allow scientists to change the structure
of living things by splicing characteristics from one species into another, for
example from nut trees into soy beans or bacteria into cows. The expectation in
agriculture is to be able to breed improved varieties much faster than through
traditional breeding, and incorporate features from a much broader gamut of
other species than has ever been possible. While the Green Revolution worked mainly
with the major grain crops, biotechnology will potentially be able to intervene
in all plant and animal species.
This has meant the attribution of
economic value to all strains, varieties and species of microorganisms, plants
and animals as potential sources of germplasm (genetic information) for plant
and animal breeding. There are myriad applications in other industrial sectors
as well, for example the modification of bacteria to express the genes of
cocoa, so that a company located in Japan or Europe can manufacture chocolate
or cocoa butter in its own bioreactors, no longer depending on plantations in
Brazil, Malaysia or Sierra Leone. The industries that come to monopolize these
biotechnologies will thus have the power not only to reprogram farming itself
in all crops, as the Green Revolution began to do, but also to actually replace
farms with biochemical factories. This tendency may be disastrous for national
and local economies that depend on the production and export of such crops.
The new technologies are now
concentrated in the hands of private companies in the First World, especially
the corporations that already run the petrochemical, pesticide, pharmaceutical,
seed and food industries. It would thus be ingenuous for us to expect results any
different from those produced by the Green Revolution. They are making the same
old promises, but with a few innovative touches. Biotechnology promises
healthier and cleaner farming, in line with environmentalist concerns raised
around the world. Yet most of the investments in farm biotechnologies so far
are aimed at breeding plant varieties resistant to herbicides (rather than to
pests or blight), thus encouraging farmers to use even more of the most
powerful chemical weedkillers.
The new Convention on Biological
Diversity, signed during the UNCED proceedings in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and
now ratified by approximately 150 countries, arose from an international
process of negotiations between rich and poor nations. It is the first attempt
to create a legally-binding international agreement to deal with the issues of
biological and genetic resources.
There is general agreement that the
planet's biological resources are at risk and that countries must take steps to
conserve them. The disputes have centered on how to conciliate the interests of
the rich countries, who want free access to the South's biodiversity, with the
latter's interest in making economic
gains from their own genetic resources, while also gaining access to advanced
biotechnologies which are protected by patents granted mostly to huge private
corporations in the North.
Genetic resources are not
distributed equally around the world. They are most abundant and diverse in
tropical and subtropical regions located in the Third World. Rich countries
have argued that biodiversity is a common heritage for all of humanity, to
maintain free access to the resources it contains. They also demand that the
Third World countries where these resources are located change their patent
laws to allow for "protection" of biotechnology products and
processes. At the same time, they refuse to facilitate a process of technology
transfer that in the medium term might offer the poor nations a better chance
to benefit from the use of their own biodiversity to meet local needs.
In short, the rich countries have
advocated a one‑way relationship: free raw materials, technological
domination and monopoly control over the products of other countries'
biodiversity.
To turn back the threats to
biodiversity itself and to the fair exchange and use of the biological and
genetic resources it contains, both national and global actions are needed. In
this sense, the existence of an international convention on the conservation
and use of biodiversity is of the utmost importance. Although it means facing
up to the monopoly interests defended by rich countries, many organizations,
social movements and political parties in the countries that control most of
the planet's biodiversity have resisted pressures to grant patents for pharmaceutical
goods and biotechnologies in general, fearing the threat to democratic and
sovereign control over their biological and genetic resources, as well as more
of the same the negative impacts on biodiversity initiated by the Green
Revolution.
The attribution of economic value to
biodiversity and to the genetic resources it contains generally refers to the
direct (albeit potential) use value of these particular natural resources in
the biotechnology industry. Ecologists also refer to the value of biodiversity
in maintaining life systems in natural biomes, while spiritual traditions
revere the intrinsic value of such myriad, dynamic and interrelated life forms
as we find on our planet. These attitudes are of course not mutually exclusive,
to the extent that they all lend strength to the need for conservation of
biodiversity. Our reflections here center on the issue of genetic resources'
economic value, but not only on their industrial use value.
In the course of negotiations around
the Biodiversity Convention and UNCED's Agenda 21, control over access to
genetic resources was raised as an issue by governments of biodiversity-rich,
developing nations such as Brazil, as an explicit trade-off for access to biotechnology
to be transferred by biodiversity-poor, developed economies. Such transfers
would, to put it simply, amount to a sort of payment for the use of
hard-to-price natural biological specimens, while at the same time helping poor
equatorial economies to develop their local "sustainable" capacities
to add value to their own genetic resources.
However ambiguous it may be,
language to this effect was actually negotiated into the Biodiversity
Convention. Nonetheless, ongoing controversies on US conditions for signing the
convention reveal that the battle around this issue still rages on. A somewhat
broader look at that negotiating process, however, places the vigor of that
"battle" in more doubtful light and reveals an even greater—or at
least different—economic value attached to genetic resources by governments
such as Brazil's.
During the biodiversity negotiations
in Nairobi and at UNCED PrepCom sessions, Brazilian diplomats advanced a
nationalistic posture, based on the perception of sovereignty over coveted
genetic resources as their strong point in the bargaining process.
International access to these resources could be conditioned to Northern
concessions on a number of other issues. Advantages ostensibly sought by Brazil
and other biodiversity-rich governments included:
1) new and additional funding for
the costs of conservation and of programs for the sustainable use of
biodiversity;
2) preferential access to new
biotechnologies, even when patented in their countries of origin;
3) guarantees regarding the
environmental safety of these technologies and of other biological products to
be transferred; and
4) diverse financial mechanisms for
these and other Agenda 21 activities, independent from the GEF and
characterized by transparency and democracy (one country, one vote) in their
international administration.
NGOs in Brazil, meanwhile, raised
several important criticisms on the stance taken by the Brazilian government:
1) The government conditions the
conservation of forests, biodiversity, etc. to the achievement of other,
basically financial, objectives. The economic equation with which it appeared
to be working seems to weigh the volume of foreign reserves to be gained in
coming years from private investments in environmentally-destructive activities
(such as the export of lumber, minerals, etc.) against the potential inflow of
international assistance for conservation efforts. From this purely economic
outlook, conservation must be first of all economically viable, and may also be
used as a leverage factor for even greater gains. The problem is that no
national initiatives at all are proposed by the government in the absence of
foreign financial input.
2) The demand for access to
cutting-edge biotechnologies, on the other hand, simply is not to be taken
seriously. As we will discuss below, the Brazilian government in April 1991 had
already sent an industrial property bill to Congress which abdicated free
access to any such technologies out of the public domain, and was perfectly
aware that no Northern government, even if it wanted to, would be able to force
private corporations to transfer any proprietary technology or products over
which the latter wished to maintain in-house control. With that patent bill
signed into law in May 1996, access to such technology will now depend solely
on patent owners' interest in having their technology used in Brazil. In
addition, overwhelming cut-backs in public spending on science and technology
(and on many other areas victimized by neo-liberal, structural adjustment
policies) have left the country with minimal prospects for absorbing any
technologies that might actually be transferred, much less for developing its
own. This demand for access to technologies through the Convention therefore
has been interpreted as a bargaining chip to be played (and given up) at the
right moment of negotiations on access to financing.
3) The emphasis on access to
cutting-edge biotechnologies belies the government's lack of interest in more
accessible or appropriate technologies for socially and environmentally
sustainable development programs.
4) The biosafety demand, another
major problem for US ratification of the convention, is another (secondary)
bargaining chip in the government's fund-raising strategy, if seen in the
domestic light of very recent and timid initiatives regarding biosafety and
bioethics. A new biosafety law was signed late in 1994, is only recently
beginning to be implemented, with the first preparatory meetings of the new
National Technical Commission on Biosafety. In negotiations on the biosafety
protocol, Brazilian representatives have been more aligned with northern
government and industry proposals (for a minimal regulatory framework to
legitimize the trade and use of what they consider to be quite safe technologies),
than with the concerns of NGOs, many scientists and a number of the other
southern governments.
5) While the government maneuvers to
gain transparency and democracy in international biodiversity funding
mechanisms, the situation is quite different inside the country, where NGOs,
social movements and civil society in general must fight tooth-and-nail even
for information—to say nothing of participation—regarding overseas financing of
development projects. The GEF continues to approve projects for biodiversity
conservation and supposedly sustainable use in Brazil (for example through
venture-capital companies set up in the Bahamas), with the approval of
Brazilian authorities, but appears to be indifferent to the need for more open
funding mechanisms that already exist and which provide for the participation
of civil society in decision-making.
A year of environmental torpor after
UNCED, the government had promised that on June 5, 1993, an "Earth
Day" package of environmental programs would be announced, including a
National Biodiversity Program. On June 3, the launching of that initiative as
drafted by the Environment Ministry was postponed, pending "further
study" by other government authorities. It is known, however, that the
biodiversity program is fundamentally limited to inventory and
conservation-unit measures, largely dependent on as yet unraised international
funding.
With regards to the economic and
other forms of perceiving and adding value to genetic resources, Brazil still
has no laws regulating access to genetic resources, although at the initiative
of environmental NGOs a bill was finally presented in the Senate late in 1995.
Science-and-technology policies in one stabilization program after another,
meanwhile, continue to look more like instruments for scrapping rather than
building any local capacity for absorbing transfers or creating new
technologies. And the current government simply followed the example of its
predecessors by placing top priority in the industrial property bill on the
patenting of biotechnologies.
The IPR bill sent to Congress in
April 1991 was the result of a commitment made by President-elect Fernando
Collor (impeached for corruption in 1993) during a visit to Washington in
January 1990. Drafted in consultation with the US government, the bill bowed to
transnational pressures for patenting of pharmaceuticals, food, life forms and
biotechnologies. Ever since 1971, these areas have been unpatentable in Brazil,
a situation allowed by international agreements such as the 1883 Paris
Convention, of which Brazil is a founding member.
However, since the 1980s, growing
charges of patent "piracy" had subjected Brazil and other countries
to trade retaliations from pharmaceutical transnationals and the US government
in particular, under the "Super-301" provisions of the US Trade Act,
which in Brazil had been suspended in response to President Collor's 1990
promises to the Reagan government. Such unilateral trade sanctions were the forebears
of more recent US efforts to enforce its national laws beyond its own
territory, such as in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute with Mexico and US economic
blockades against Cuba, Iran and Libya.
Industrial property was also the
object of negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the GATT, where the Brazilian
government has expressed no opposition to Arthur Dunkel's 1991 proposed
"Final Agreement" on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights). This proposed agreement was to effectively supersede the
Paris Convention and create an international patent enforcement authority under
what finally came to be known as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor of GATT. From the very beginning, however, the Brazilian government's
bill went beyond the conditions conceded in TRIPS negotiations, and added
additional benefits for transnationals such as pipeline privileges and
patenting of transgenic plants and animals.
Brazil's industrial property
legislation covers much more than patent rights. Changes proposed in the 241
articles of the government's original 1991 bill affected areas ranging from
inventions, utility models and industrial designs to trade marks, technology
transfer and unfair competition.
On biotechnologies, the original
bill proposed that only "plant varieties" and "animal
breeds" be excepted from patenting, with special separate legislation to
be written on the protection of rights on both these areas. There was no
mention at all, much less exceptions made, for biotechnological processes. Only
"unmodified biological material found in nature" would be excluded
from the category of "inventions" in the executive's initial version
of the patent bill.
The process by which bills are
approved by Congress is quite similar to that of the US. The patent bill was
first sent to the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, which approved its
version in 1993. The Federal Senate then made several amendments, voted in
early 1996, after which finally a final compromise version was approved by the
Chamber of Deputies in April, and signed into law by President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso on May 14, 1996.
As in the Chilean and Mexican
experiences with their 1990s-version IPR bills, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
was totally unaware of the implications of this initiative and unprepared to
discuss it with any political or technical competence. Initial reactions by
part of civil society (members of the scientific community, Brazilian
pharmaceutical firms and—strategically—the Patent Office [INPI] Employees
Association) led a handful of progressive/nationalist deputies to create enough
of a commotion to derail official hopes for immediate approval.
A Special Commission on Industrial
Property was created in the Chamber of Deputies in October, and held public
hearings in November and December of 1991. By June 1992, the Commission's
raporteur had handed in two substitute drafts, modifying the original bill
essentially to include further US demands. An impasse was created by the
refusal of part of the center-right majority to endorse several of these
points, and soon the impeachment proceedings against President Collor had put
the IPR bill on ice, as far as the Congress was concerned, until early 1993. In
March of 1993, the new government presented an alternate compromise draft at
the same time that overt US threats to renew Super-301 sanctions were being
brandished by the major national media, which condemned this draft as the
product of "backwards nationalism." A theater of public hearings on
the bill was combined with ramrod negotiations between the government, the
political center and the right, and a final compromise was finally approved by
the Chamber of Deputies on June 2, 1993.
The Chamber of Deputies gave in on
most of the foreign biochemical industry's demands (backed up by new USTR trade
threats against Brazilian exports): the bill would approve patents on
pharmaceutical and food products and processes, biotech processes and
"microorganisms"; it extended patent validity from 15 to 20 years;
and it brought the law into full force within one year after it's signing.
However, it stopped short of US (and some Dunkel) demands in that the approved
text would require local use of the patent (manufacture in Brazil) as well as
allowing imports from legal licensees in other countries, compulsory licensing
in the cases of dependent patent requests or of "public interest" and
extension of "pipeline" rights on currently unpatentable subject
matter only to products or processes which have never been disclosed anywhere
in the world.
With regards to biotechnologies,
very clear language was approved in that version of the bill, providing that
natural biological material and natural biological processes are not
inventions, making them unpatentable. This was a tremendous advance compared to
the government's first 1991 version (which said that only "unmodified
biological material found in nature" was not to be considered an
invention). However, as long as they can meet generic criteria for being
inventions (novelty, inventive step, industrial application), all
biotechnological processes were deemed patentable. Very confusing language, on
the other hand, makes undefined "microorganisms" patentable, "as
long as their use is only for a given process which generates a specific
product" ("desde que sua utilização se dê unicamente para um determinado
processo que gera um produto específico") . The proposal put forth by NGOs, many scientists, the Church
and others was that biotechnologies and all biological material be declared
unpatentable in this overall industrial property law, so that a longer process
of discussion be allowed to define these IPRs in separate legislation. Even
with the entry into force of the new GATT agreement in 1995, with its
provisions for "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights" (TRIPS), Brazil would have until the year 2005 to define how it
would grant patents for microorganisms and for biotechnological processes.
The NGOs' interpretation of these provisions
was that, while natural or purified bacteria, fungi or cell-line isolates, for
example, would probably not be patentable, nearly everything else modern
biotech industries are patenting in the US will be, including the extension of
biotechnological process IPRs to the plants and animals they are used to
obtain. For government spokespersons and for center and right-wing politicians,
however, it is enough that Brazil's natural products—and therefore its
biodiversity—cannot be patented. While this is somewhat of an advance, strictly
speaking, they have nonetheless absolutely refused to admit any discussion on
the implications of patenting the biotechnological processes used to screen,
develop and use Brazil's natural genetic resources. The economic value of such
resources would belong to those controlling these patented technologies—mostly
transnational corporations and a few foreign universities—rather than to
Brazilians, who continue to furnish them for free.
In short, in terms of policies on
sovereignty over its biodiversity as the patent bill moved from the Chamber of
Deputies to the Senate, the Brazilian government still had no plans to develop
laws regulating access to genetic resources, while IPRs over biotechnologies
and their products were being defined in terms deemed to be acceptable to
transnational corporate interests. In May 1993, coincidentally, the Congress
also began procedures for ratification of the Convention on Biodiversity. Yet
these issues were never raised in the discussions on ratification. It would be
up to NGOs, the scientific community and other forces in civil society to
challenge this stance.
Senators were also under pressure
from many of the same forces active in the Chamber of Deputies. The Government
and the transnational biochemical companies (through their Interfarma lobbying
organization) continued to push for approval of the bill, while also demanding
additional and more extensive rights and fewer restrictions or obligations. Organizations
from civil society, including unions, professional organizations, the Church,
scientific societies, NGOs and the national pharmaceutical industry, continued
their campaign centered on no patents for life forms and biotechnologies, but
also with strong concerns around pharmaceuticals, "pipeline" and
compulsory licensing provisions, patent validity terms and a longer transition
period before the law comes into force. Over a thousand of these organizations
had joined—and dozens were active—in an umbrella grouping coordinating these
lobbying efforts with headquarters in Sao Paulo, called the Forum for the Free
Use of Knowledge (Fórum pela Liberdade do
Uso do Conhecimento).
The bill spent over two and a half
years in the Senate, and a number of amendments to the Chamber of Deputies'
1993 version were actually approved, thus demanding another vote in the Chamber
of Deputies, which would have the final word on choosing between provisions in
each of the two versions, before the bill could be sent to the President for
signature, possible vetoes and publication.
When it arrived in the Senate in
mid-1993, the patent bill was sent to be examined for recommendations by two
standing thematic commissions: the Constitution and Justice Commission (CCJ)
and the Economic Affairs Commission (CAE). In late 1993, a public hearing was
held by a joint session of the two commissions, and in mid-1994 another one was
held shortly before Congress virtually shut down for the national election
campaign.
Since Brazil's ratification of the
GATT agreement late in 1994 (there was actually heated debate precisely about
TRIPs preceding the Senate vote), TRIPs has become the limit for all parties in
the discussion. One could rant and rave against it, but only a foolhardy
dreamer might imagine Congress approving language contrary to a binding
international agreement it had just approved. ("Implementing
legislation" was not included in the GATT ratification process.)
Fortunately, the patent bill's first rapporteur in 1994 and his successor in
1995 both took very open-minded and nationalistic approaches, with highly
competent support from their staff of aids. Those two rapporteurs and their
aids were very receptive to contacts and suggestions from the multiple groups
and social movements engaged in the fight against the bill (scientists,
agricultural researchers, environmentalists, Church, unions, local
pharmaceutical industry, etc.), unlike the experience in the Chamber of
Deputies, where it had been a losing, up-hill battle against ignorance, a
stacked-deck commission and a totally pro-PhRMA rapporteur.
Under the new Clinton
administration, Mickey Kantor and PhRMA (the US Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers' Association, represented in Brazil by the Interfarma) kept up
all the pressure that Carla Hills and the PMA (PhRMA's predecessor, the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association) had brought to bear before them
during the Reagan and Bush years, while the successive governments in
Brazil—Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso—all bent
over backwards to be compliant. For the Brazilian government, the "patent
issue" was essentially an uncomfortable thorn in the side of US-Brazil
relations, a problem to be "put behind us" as expeditiously as possible.
The Brazilian government at the same time was going out of its way to show
"best behavior" on global issues ranging from patents and
biodiversity to debt, GEF and peace-keeping forces in its bid for a permanent
seat on a restructured UN Security Council. The only federal government agency
that had worked closely and publicly alongside civil society (Embrapa/Cenargen)
against the patenting of plants and animals, and for a separate piece of
legislation to establish patent rules for microorganisms and biotech processes
at a later date, was officially gagged early in 1995 by the President's Office.
The approach in the Senate,
therefore, was to "adapt" to TRIPs. The Senators certainly look to
their own parochial political interests, but are intelligent and vain enough
by-and-large to want to feel they have been convinced about what they're voting
on. They generally shun being labeled either as "out-dated
nationalists" or as wanting to "sell out the country", and
appreciate being offered a "pragmatic middle ground", especially on
such a complicated issue as patents. In this sense, convincing arguments were
presented by representatives of broad-based social movements (who testified at
the hearings, made personal visits to many Senators, sent hundreds of letters,
faxes, etc.) proposing no pipeline, a five-year grace period, international
exhaustion (parallel imports), local use, broader provisions for compulsory
licensing, all TRIPs safeguards for reversing the burden of proof, etc.
On biotech, the movements sought to
draw the clearest possible line between unpatentable plants and animals, on the
one hand, and patentable "microorganisms" on the other. The article
(10) approved by the Chamber of Deputies that places natural living beings and
biological materials and processes outside the realm of inventions was seen as
essentially acceptable.
The main thrust of discussions in
the Senate focused on article 18 of the bill, regarding "non-patentable
inventions." Here the intention of civil society's lobby was, on the one
hand, to maintain the linkage between a microorganism and a specific process
and product (as somewhat of a limitation) and, on the other, to define as
clearly as possible what a patentable microorganism actually is. This
definition first of all would have to exclude the "whole or parts of
plants and animals". It would also state that only "transgenic
microorganisms" are patentable, and that transgenic means undergoing
direct, human intervention at a molecular level in the microorganism's genetic
composition in order to express a novel characteristic. This would amount to
explicit criteria for the "inventive step" requirement in the case of
microorganisms. Various formulations appeared in different drafts in the Senate
commissions, but there was a consensus amongst the Senators of all political
shades that language very close to this should be approved, in order to avoid
patents on plants and animals.
There were also two other important
articles on biotech. One was on the rights of the patent owner (article 42,
regarding the products of patented processes, which should make an explicit
exception for products which are not patentable themselves under articles 10 or
18). The other was in the final and transitional provisions of the bill regarding
the so-called "pipeline," to assure that outstanding biotech patent
applications already filed at the Patent Office would not be granted when the new law comes into force. Another point
raised in the rapporteur's amendments was that microorganism patent disclosure
shall (rather than "may") be accompanied by the deposit of material
in one of the centers recognized by the Budapest Treaty or by the Brazilian
patent authority (INPI). In case the definition of microorganism were to be
weakened or vetoed by the President (also a fear), there are also two items (in
article 43) to establish the farmers' privilege and the breeders' exemption for
patented "biological material." A third paragraph proposed for that
same article would also have assured that the transfer of components of a
patented microorganism to a non-patentable organism would not transfer the
former's patent rights to the latter.
In the Constitution and Justice
Commission (CCJ), the first of the two Senate commissions to give its opinion,
the original nationalistic rapporteur (Sen. Antônio Mariz) was elected governor
of his State in 1994, and left his post to his substitute, Sen. Ney Suassuna,
with the political mission to continue working on the patent bill with the same
orientation. Sen. Suassuna presented his proposal for an entirely new bill in
April 1995, and it was negotiated and approved on May 17 in the CCJ. This
version of the bill was very good from the point of view of the Forum for the
Free Use of Knowledge on all but two of the points mentioned above: it only
provided a one-year grace period, and it contained no definition for transgenic
microorganisms.
On September 27, 1995, the Economic
Affairs Commission (CAE) voted and approved its own new version of the bill, in
essentially the same terms proposed by this commission's rapporteur, Sen.
Fernando Bezerra, in his own substitute bill presented a few weeks earlier.
Sen. Bezerra had drafted a "TRIPs-Plus" bill which was totally
acquiescent to the most pro-industry interpretation of TRIPs, plus everything
that the US government and the PhRMA were demanding in addition (particularly
the broad, retroactive "pipeline" provisions). The government and its
leader in the Senate managed to approve this version in the CAE, but—very
significantly—felt the need to give in on one point: they accepted the critics'
definition of transgenic microorganisms, excluding plants and animals, etc.
So by October 1995, there were three
versions of the bill: (1) the bill approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 1993
which is mostly bad on nearly all points, (2) the CCJ bill which was mostly
acceptable—as far as TRIPs might allow—except for "microorganisms"
and grace period, and (3) the CAE bill which is mostly very bad, except for
"microorganisms". All three versions were presented in the Senate
plenary on October 10, when a number of further amendments were presented by
several Senators. With the new amendments, the whole package was sent back to
the two same commissions, for a final opinion to be given by each, to be followed
by a final vote by the full Senate.
The same two Senators were
maintained as rapporteurs in their respective commissions, and by the end of
November had both presented their new reports. Sen. Suassuna in the CCJ
essentially maintained the proposal approved in May by that same commission,
and—with the support of the movements involved in this struggle—introduced two
major innovations: a good, restrictive definition of microorganisms, and a
five-year grace period (the same as had recently been approved in Argentina).
Sen. Bezerra, in the CAE, presented some minor changes, including a watering
down of the restrictions on microorganisms, but essentially maintained all his
TRIPs-Plus provisions.
On December 7, 1995 came the most
significant breakthrough for critics of the bill in four and a half years of
Congressional debate. The CCJ voted unanimously to accept Sen. Suassuna's new
proposal. To put this victory in as realistic as possible terms, the CCJ's
version of the patent bill contained everything that the movement had been able
to formulate in the fight for elbow-room within the straight-jacket of TRIPs.
There would be no pipeline at all, there would be a 5-year transitional period
before the law takes effect, local production is required within 3 years after
the patent is issued, parallel imports were to be allowed, compulsory licenses
could be granted (within TRIPs limits) as an administrative (rather than
judicial) decision, the patent office (INPI) would keep its authority to
approve all international technology-transfer contracts, and the burden of
proof could only be reversed by a court decision.
For biotech and life patents, the
CCJ's new version of the bill was also fairly restrictive. Naturally-occurring
life forms and biological materials and processes were also explicitly
considered to be non-inventions, and therefore not patentable (art. 10). In
article 18, the whole or parts of plants and animals would not be patentable
even if they qualified as "inventions", since they were explicitly
excluded from the definition of "transgenic microorganisms" (as
described above), which were to be the only patentable "living
beings". Process patents (art. 42) would not grant the patent holder
rights over unpatentable products. Patentable biotechnological processes (this
draft bill's version of "non-essentially biological processes") were
also defined restrictively to be "any concatenation of actions, except for
that of natural biological processes, which use living organisms to elaborate
or modify products, to improve plants and animals or to obtain, develop and
modify a specific microorganism." Finally, patent rights over genes in
transgenic microorganisms would have no effect when they are spliced into
unpatentable plants or animals (art. 43).
It was politically very important
that even the government's leader in the Senate recognized the GATT legality of
Sen. Suassuna's version of the bill as approved by the CCJ, as this raised
hopes that further debate would be defused at least on this issue. The other main
political argument used by the government for a "TRIPs-Plus" patent
law, namely how much US retaliations will cost in terms of Brazilian exports,
caused as much indignation as it did fear in the Congress and thus could cut
either way. (Significantly, the paper and pulp industry, slated to be hit by
Section-301 sanctions, was heard to be less worried about immediate US
surcharges on its exports than it was about biotech patents that might hinder
technological advances in the long-term development of its huge eucalyptus
plantations. But representatives of that sector did not come to Congress to
actively make their point.) The unanimity of the vote in the CCJ was certainly
a surprise to all observers. Yet, whatever the government's motives were for
backing down on December 7, the fact is that it changed its approach entirely
when the vote finally came before the Economic Affairs Commission. Initially
scheduled to vote on Sen. Bezerra's report on December 12, the final decision
was put off until late January, at which time the pro-government and PhRMA
forces had seduced or collared a majority of the CAE.
When the Economic Affairs Commission
(CAE) reported out Sen. Bezerra's version of the bill, with its essentially
"TRIPs-Plus" approach on everything but the definition of
microorganisms, the vote was not unanimous (18 to 7 for the Bezerra draft),
raising some hope that Sen. Suassuna's more progressive version might fare
better in the final vote on the Senate floor. However the government's
"steam-roller" tactics to keep its majority in line were successful
and the CAE's vote was upheld by the Senate as a whole, by a vote of 46-16 on
February 29.
Yet the definition of transgenic
microorganisms had also been left vulnerable in the Senate's final version of
the bill. Article 18, item III, stated that "the whole or part of living
beings, except for microorganisms that meet the three requirements of
patentability - novelty, inventive step and industrial application - provided
by Art. 8 and that are not mere discoveries" would not be patentable.
Although this might sound adequate at first sight, item III had unexplainable
left out the word "transgenic" as an adjective for patentable
microorganisms. The definition of "transgenic microorganisms" in a
separate paragraph to the same article was thus left hanging on a concept that
was simply not used in the rest of the law.
When the bill returned to the
Chamber of Deputies with the amendments from the Senate, the voting was on each
of the Senate's amendments, posed against the lower house's original provisions
on each point. No new language or amendments could be written at this point.
When the President finally signed the bill into law, he would be able to veto
whole articles, paragraphs or discrete sub-items, but not words or phrases.
This was the final stage of the fight.
Specifically with regards to
"transgenic microorganisms," as voted by the Senate, the whole
definition could possibly be vetoed, as was gleefully pointed out by some of
its opponents who hoped to patent transgenic plants and animals. While it was
conceivable that such a veto (which would also potentially imply the patenting
of human beings and our components) could later be overridden by Congress, this
would be difficult. ("Hindsight" even suggested that a better tack
might have been to provide simply that non-patentable inventions include simply
"the whole or parts of plants and animals," rather than also going
into complicated definitions of "microorganisms". But no such
amendment had been presented on the Senate floor when the bill was read there
in October 1995, so this option was no longer a possibility.) It might have
been costly in political terms for Fernando Henrique to veto Congress' final word
on one of the most polemical and hotly-contested items in this entire law, but
he would have a convenient technical argument to stand on: that the definition
in the paragraph did not correspond to the "microorganisms" mentioned
in item III.
In their haste, the pro-patent
congressmen responsible for getting the new law on the books had not actually
noticed this "error," until
it was brought to the attention of rapporteur Ney Lopes (by a colleague
sympathetic to the bill's critics) on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies as
the final vote was about to take place. The rapporteur, who had been instructed
(and ingenuously believed) that the bill was not to patent plants and animals,
accepted the suggestion and endorsed approval of a "corrective"
amendment to include the word "transgenic" in item III, thus assuring
coherence with the definition. The bill as a whole was immediately voted and
approved as proposed by the rapporteur, on the evening of April 10, 1996.
There were indignant reactions by
proponents of biotechnology patents to the "correction" voted by the
Chamber of Deputies. Their plan to justify a veto of the restrictive definition
of transgenic microorganisms had been thwarted by a last-minute – but entirely
legal – parliamentary maneuver which was entirely acceptable to all members of
Congress, who had been led to believe by the government that there would be no
patents on plants or animals.
Yet the overall official reaction to
Congress' final vote on the Patent Bill was of course a major celebration. On
May 14, 1996 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso finally signed the bill into
law, at a gala ceremony covered extensively by the national press. The new
"Industrial Property Law" (Nº 9.279/96) was published by the official
gazette (Diário Oficial da União) on
May 15, five full years after it had first been sent to Congress.
Now, the country was assured by its
leaders, Brazil had resolved all its major outstanding points of conflict with
the United States and would be free to join global markets, attract foreign
technology and investments and some day achieve First-World status.
In terms of the new law's more
general provisions, all the important demands from Northern governments and
investors were satisfied. As demanded by the GATT/TRIPs agreement, previously
excluded areas, including medicines and food, are now patentable, as well as
the entire range of modern biotechnologies and transgenic microorganisms that
qualify as inventions (art. 18). Entrepreneurs sued in Brazilian courts for
patent violations will also have to bear the burden of proof against any
accusations brought against them (art. 42/2º).
Other provisions, however, go even
farther than anything demanded by GATT. The law becomes effective immediately
for the chemical and pharmaceutical industry's new retroactive
"pipeline" rights, and only one year later for all other provisions
(art. 243). The pipeline will probably be the most expensive imposition for
Brazil in the short term, since the country will now have to pay royalties for
several years to use products and technologies that had previously been in the
public domain (art. 230). Brazil's industrial property office (the INPI) will
lose its power to approve or reject contracts involving international technology
transfer agreements based on the country's own development interests (art.
211), but in compensation will gain the power to decide on the legitimacy and
the technical and economic capability of Brazilian companies interested in the
local production of patented goods that are simply imported by transnationals
(art. 68/2º).
On the controversial provisions for
patents on life forms and biotechnologies, pressure from social movements
(scientists, environmentalists, Churches, etc.) at least achieved more stringent
limits on this "right" than the government and the transnationals had
originally intended. This means that natural biological products and processes,
as well as all plants and animals, are not (at least directly) patentable. Most
new patent laws in southern countries have not included even these
restrictions, but hopes that the law could go even further in this area were
frustrated.
Patents on biotechnological
processes under the new law, in the absence of any control whatsoever over
access to the country's genetic resources, mean that real access to the
potential economic value of these resources may depend on licenses to be
granted (or withheld) by northern patent-holders who control the technology for
their study and manipulation. Their techniques are now well protected, but
Brazil's genetic resources will still be free for the taking, until a new law
proposed by NGOs to control this access is approved.
The law will also provide two kinds
of "virtual" patents over unpatentable plants and animals. Process
patents, first of all, will grant patent rights over the products – even
transgenic plants and animals – they are used to create (art. 42/II), while
plants and animals will likewise be subject to patents on any genes spliced
into them from transgenic microorganisms. With this "virtual"
patenting of transgenic plants, the government's Plant Breeders' Rights bill is
now being seen as complementing – rather than substituting – plant patents.
The specific impact of the
retroactive "pipeline" provisions (art. 229) for biotechnologies, on
the other hand, may well be a major setback for many projects already underway
in Brazil, since foreign patent-holders will now be able to charge for, or even
to force suspension of, the use of now patentable technologies (such as PCR,
gene guns, etc.) which have been in use for many years in a number of public
research institutions. (The text of these
and related articles have been translated in Appendix II.)
The only arguments offered by the
Brazilian government to justify its celebration of the new patent rules imposed
by GATT and the US government make one wonder if this is really the way a
country can hope to gain "respect" in the world:
1. the
end of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry's "piracy" of modern
drugs (although this sector was never benefited by the kind of incentives and
subsidies that North American companies continue to receive from their own
government),
2. the
presumption that advanced technologies will now be transferred to Brazil
(although the US refusal to sign the Biodiversity Convention in 1992 made it
crystal clear that patents are to preserve and not to share technological
power), and
3. the
suspension of US threats of reprisals against Brazilian exports (brandished
unilaterally by that government in flagrant violation of the new GATT's
multilateral dispute settlement provisions, despite the recognition of all
TRIPs provisions even by the Brazilian opposition).
Throughout the five years it took to
have the patent bill approved in Congress, very few members of Congress ever
came to understand even two or three of its technical points, much less their
political meaning. The vast majority simply voted with their party leaders. The
government's own spokespersons sent to testify and lobby for the bill were
generally much more persuasive in their political than in their technical
arguments. Outside Congress in civil society, however, all the national
organizations that sat down to study and take a position on the patent bill
came out clearly against it. There has long been a pat phrase in Brazilian
politics about "hidden interests", and in fact no one has been able
to explain the past three governments' obsession with obeying Washington's
dictates on this law.
It is both heartening and
frustrating to conclude that Brazil's new industrial property law is probably
not as bad as it might have been. The experience here has been quite different
from that of other Latin American countries in pushing through new patent laws
this decade. In Mexico, Chile and the Andean Pact, these laws were passed
before most of those countries' movements even knew what was going on, much
less what was at stake, and only the Colombians have tried to make up for their
losses on patents (and PBRs) with their new law on access to genetic resources.
In Argentina, there was much discussion on patents, but mostly on the behalf of
the local pharmaceutical industry, with virtually no broader social or
environmental movements active on issues like biotech and life patents.
Brazil has not put hundreds (much
less hundreds of thousands) of farmers and activists on the streets against
GATT and patents on life, but there has really been a broad-based lobbying
movement directed at members of Congress since 1991, with a loose-knit Branca
Leone Army of activists frequently visiting them personally, and attending,
leafleting and/or speaking at public hearings, in addition to doing direct
mailings (normal and eMail) to hundreds of organizations and trekking around
the country to give talks and encourage the sending of letters, faxes,
resolutions, etc. Such lobbying is still a new thing in Brazil, ten years after
the end of a 20-year dictatorship (and with civil society at a very different
stage in its evolution than in the early 60s), so it was at the very least a
major learning experience for all.
The Brazilian movements and
organizations active in fighting the government's proposals for patents on life
and biotechnologies had arrived very early at the conclusion that any
alternative proposals in this area would have to face up to several real-world
considerations. The Brazilian constitution guarantees a "temporary
privilege" for use of industrial inventions, and most of the country's
scientific community does feel that
there is inventiveness to be rewarded in the field of biotechnologies, the
problem being a need to clearly define the scope and timeliness of patent
coverage. On the other hand, the balance of power in international relations—as
evidenced in the 1991 "Dunkel Draft" for the Uruguay Round, followed
by GATT's Final Agreement reached in 1994—swayed towards the establishment of
new global rules and authority not only for patents but for a tidal wave of
vital concerns ranging from the international division of labor to the
environment, consumer rights and deep-rooted issues of national sovereignty,
democracy and the decentralization of national power. Under the humble
assumption that they may not be able to immediately turn this tidal wave back,
and considering that a new patent law would in fact soon be approved (and had
to be, since the current law by its omission could be used to approve biotech
patents), all these sectors found it best to forward amendments on the patent
bill that the current Brazilian Congress would be prepared to accept.
An all-or-nothing approach,
advocating a total ban on life and biotech patents, would most likely be
frustrated as impractical or utopian, at least in the short run. Negotiating
the technicalities with the politicians to establish "acceptable" or
"consensus" limits, on the other hand, constantly ran into the
concrete problem of a lack of comprehension on the part of the members of
Congress, very few of whom ever took the time to delve into this particular
aspect of contemporary IPRs (and all of whom want a quick solution), and also
of a lack of clarity anyplace in the world on what all this language really
means or implies in practical terms, where rights over biotech patents actually
begin and are exhausted, etc.
There exists in Brazil, if not a
consensus, at least an overwhelming majority opinion amongst NGOs, the Church,
the breeders' and scientific communities that plants and animals should not be
patented, and that patents should not be used to alienate control over Brazil's
biodiversity. The right-wing rural oligarchy's representatives in Congress have
in fact come to understand that patented seeds, cattle, horses, etc. are also a
threat to local seed companies run by big farmers and cooperatives, and to
ranchers who are also animal breeders. The problem was how to write this into a
succinct, politically expedient article that everyone can understand and be
sure of what it will mean in practice. In the process of negotiations leading
up to the June 1993 vote in the Chamber of Deputies, a majority was formed
around this intention, but the language approved—as discussed above—does not
really live up to their hopes.
The proposal put forth by NGOs, and
supported by the other social forces critically involved in this effort, was
that the entire issue be left to a separate law, since the implications of
patents on life and biotechnologies are too momentous to be left to a hurried
process of political negotiations. Arguments in favor of this proposal were
basically that the matter is too complex for either scientists or politicians
to grapple with and resolve immediately, that the patent system itself is
poorly adapted to protecting both the inventor's and society's interests in the
case of biotechnologies (for that very reason, alternative approaches have
already been established for software and electronic circuit topographies, for
example), that there are other issues to be resolved in tandem with biotech
IPRs (access to genetic resources, intellectual property rights of indigenous
peoples, etc.), that the granting of biotech IPRs should still be held as a
bargaining chip by Brazilian negotiators in the unfolding negotiations around
implementation of the Biodiversity Convention and, finally, that the TRIPS
chapter in the GATT Agreement would allow developing countries like Brazil a
period of ten years to extend patent coverage to areas currently exempted from
patentability—so what's the hurry? If the European Parliament has taken so many
years to come up with a law to protect biotechnological inventions (not that we
like what they may approve), why couldn't we?
The hope behind this proposal was
not only to gain time to educate scientists, politicians and society at large
about what this all means, but also that internationally new proposals might
appear and gain legitimacy, that a new plateau be achieved for informed
discussion and negotiations. The problem was that this proposal would mean
writing a ban on patenting all life forms and all biotechnologies into this
industrial property bill, and that simply sounded very radical to most
politicians, accustomed as they are to always maneuvering into some kind of a
middle-ground solution. To them, the idea that a total ban on biotech IPRs
today is itself a middle-ground solution, to be able to write a better law in
the future, looked like a trick. As a result, the small group of activists most
directly engaged in this lobbying effort, even though supported by a myriad of
social movements and organizations, were unable to convince a majority of
members of Congress that this solution would be in Brazil's best interest.
Several of the organizations active
in the national movement against this law now believe that its negative impacts
will become apparent within a very few years (in the prices of medicine and
processed food, in technological dependency and lags, growing royalty payments
on the balance of services, etc.), and that it will then be possible to speak
of the need for amendments, not only in Brazil but in many other countries
whose government's have also rushed into this game without stopping to consider
alternatives. Even today, however, there are three other major bills in
Congress which bear a direct relation to industrial property rights, and in
which issues of national interest are at stake.
The three bills currently under
discussion in the Brazilian Congress refer specifically to (1) establishment of
a regime for access to genetic resources, (2) rights of indigenous peoples in
general, including their intellectual rights and (3) plant breeders rights for
commercial seed companies. The first two of these bills (access and indigenous
rights) are important initiatives of Brazilian civil society to protect
national and social interests in key areas affected by the expansion of patent
rights. The third bill (PBRs) comes from abroad, an initiative being pushed by
the same transnationals that imposed the new IPR law, to complement their
patents on agricultural plants.
This bill (PL Nº 306/95) was
presented in the Federal Senate in October 1995 by Senator Marina Silva, a
member of the Workers' Party (PT) from the Amazonian State of Acre. The
initiative for the bill came at the suggestion of NGOs active against the
patent bill, who were concerned that the Brazilian government had shown no
interest in implementing provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity
for control over access to the country's genetic resources. It is currently
being discussed by the Social Affairs Commission of the Senate, and once
approved there will still have to go through a vote on the Senate floor and
then obtain approval of the Chamber of Deputies, before being signed into law
by the President.
The suggestions presented during a
series of public hearings, as well as discussions amongst NGOs, scientists,
government officials and others may lead to the publication of a new version of
the bill by the end of this year. There is some hope that the bill can make its
way through the two houses of Congress and become law by the end of 1997.
This bill's major objective is to
create rules and conditions for the granting of access to genetic and
biological resources in Brazil, when these are to be used for commercial
purposes other than their immediate sale or consumption. A key target is the
valuing of genetic resources such as plant, animal and microbial genetic
information through the use of biotechnologies, to assure some economic and
technological gain for Brazil, as provided particularly by articles 15 and 16
of the Convention on Biological Diversity (currently ratified by over 150
countries). The approach being taken is to require the signing of a contract
amongst all interested parties (the governmental authority, bioprospectors
whether Brazilian or foreign, Brazilian counterparts of foreign bioprospectors,
and when appropriate, local communities whose knowledge of these resources is
to be used). The contract must contain provisions established by the new law.
At the same time, conditions will be
established whereby the "intangible component" of genetic resources
will also be valued to the benefit of indigenous and other local communities
such as farmers and forest communities, whose knowledge of the properties of
medicinal plants, plant varieties used in agriculture, etc. is of great
economic importance to industries that consume the genetic resources. But the
fact that this freely shared contribution has recently gained such tremendous
market value calls for the creation of mechanisms to directly repay these
communities when this is possible, and to promote the survival and well-being
of the communities which continue to conserve and live off the biological
diversity in their surroundings. The frustrating experience of the FAO's
toothless (and penniless) mechanisms to defend "farmers' rights"
through international agreements may therefore begin to find a way to become
reality for a diversity of excluded social sectors through national legislation.
This bill was introduced in the
Chamber of Deputies five years ago (PL Nº 2.057/91), and has been dormant since
June 1994. Its overall aim is to regulate in law the provisions created by
Brazil's new 1988 Constitution regarding the rights of indigenous societies.
The broad objectives cover the legal situation of Indians and their communities
and protection for their customs, culture and territorial rights, include
specific means to protect the "indigenous heritage" and also their
"intellectual property".
The current version of this bill was
approved by the Chamber of Deputies and should already have been sent to the
Senate. Political contingencies, however, have led the government to hold up
the process in order to continue to work under current legislation. When this
deadlock will be broken is still in doubt.
Discussions on the above-mentioned
bill on access to genetic resources, however, have provided much-needed
insights for the indigenous movements and the NGOs which support them with
regards to this bill's 16 articles on indigenous heritage and intellectual
property rights. There is an understanding that the two bills must be made
entirely compatible, and that–conceptually–the notion of intellectual property
should be replaced by a broader approach covering community intellectual
rights, since property rights in this area are now seen as a straight-jacket
for the implementation of rights over knowledge that is held and used
collectively.
While the two previous bills (access
and indigenous societies) arose from initiatives by Brazilian civil society and
specific social movements, the "Cultivars Act" presented by the
government in January 1996 (PL Nº 1.46/96) in the Chamber of Deputies, is a
direct (and compliant) response to international pressures from the same
transnationals that imposed the new patent law.
The purpose of this bill, as
presented, is to create industrial property rights similar to patents over
seeds used in agriculture, in order to assure commercial plant breeders a
monopoly over the new plant varieties (or cultivars) which they put on the
market. This monopoly is the backbone of what is known internationally as
"plant breeders' rights" (PBRs).
While the law would provide some
exceptions to normal patent rules for farmers (to plant back seeds on their own
farms) and for other breeders (to use protected varieties in their own breeding
activities), it does create a clear monopoly which will transform the currently
competitive seed sector, as well as requiring degrees of genetic homogeneity in
crops which fly directly in the face of modern agronomic considerations
favorable to diversity.
The Brazilian government believes
that Brazil must implement this legislation in order to be able to join an
international convention called the International Union for the Protection of
New Plant Varieties (UPOV). The UPOV, although it has been in existence for 35
years, has yet to gain more than 35 countries in the world as members. This is
quite a different situation from the Convention on Biological Diversity, which
has gained over 150 members in less than four years. The reason for this
situation is that UPOV has historically been limited to northern industrialized
countries which are headquarters to the world's seed industry. The advent of
plant applications for biotechnology has consolidated a trend in which the
world's largest pesticide companies have been taking over seed companies since
the 1970s. Since these are also the same companies that dominate global
pharmaceutical production as well as the marketing of new biotechnological
products in general, there has been a convergence of pressures by those
governments and companies for Southern countries to adopt PBR laws to
complement the new patent laws.
This bill has been under discussion
since June 1996 by a Special Commission created in the Chamber of Deputies. The
Special Commission will probably report the bill out the floor of the Chamber
of Deputies before the end of the year, after which it will still have to be
approved by the Senate (precisely the same procedure as in the patent bill).
The government is exerting major pressure on its majority of supporters in
Congress to have this bill passed into law as soon as possible, however
counter-pressures from agricultural-related NGOs, such as those in the PTA
Network headed by the AS-PTA, are beginning to sow doubts in the minds of many
members of Congress. It may be possible at least to incorporate major changes
into the bill to safeguard the interests of farmers and Brazilian seed
companies, as well as assuring protection for "farmers' rights" over
seeds provided to commercial breeders.
Following are the industrial
property bill's main relevant provisions regarding patents on biotechnologies
(processes) and life forms (products) as it was approved by the Chamber of
Deputies in June 1992. Article 42, on the rights conferred by the patent, is
also included here in its entirety, to show how the text goes far beyond
current GATT/TRIPS requirements (e.g., control over exports, reversal of the
burden of proof).
ARTICLE 10. The
following are not considered inventions or utility models:
(...)
IX - the whole or part of natural
living beings and biological material found in nature, or even if isolated from
it, including the genome or germplasm of any natural living being and natural
biological processes.
ARTICLE 18. The
following [inventions or utility models] are not patentable:
(...)
III - living beings, including
microorganisms when isolated from an industrial process.
Sole paragraph - The prohibitions in
this article, aside from the provisions of article 10, item IX, do not pertain
to patent claims for inventions related to microorganisms, as long as these are
used only for a particular process which generates a specific product.
ARTICLE 42. The patent
grants its owner the right to prevent third parties not having his consent from
making, using, selling, presenting for sale, buying, offering, importing,
exporting or storing:
I - the product which is the subject
matter of a patent;
II - the process or product obtained
by a patented process;
III - components of a patented
product, or material or equipment for the use of a patented process, when the
final application of the component, material or equipment necessarily leads to
use of the protected invention or model.
ARTICLE 43. The
provisions of the preceding article to not apply:
(...)
V - to third parties who, in the
case of patents involving living matter, use, without economic objectives, the
patented product as an initial source of variation or propagation to obtain
other products; and
VI - to third parties who, in the
case of patents involving living matter, use, place in circulation or market a
patented product which has been lawfully introduced into commerce by the patent
owner or by a license holder, as long as the patented product is not used for
the commercial multiplication or propagation of said living matter.
The bill as approved by the Chamber
of Deputies thus would have allowed the patenting of "microorganisms"
(with dubious and, at the very least, original qualifications) and of all
biological and biotechnological processes that can qualify as inventions.
Many comments could be made on
implications of the provisions in the articles transcribed above, but most of
these are discussed in relation to the final text of the new patent law, in
Appendix II, and thus not repeated here.
1) HALF-BAKED SPECIFICITIES: In Article
18, the Chamber of Deputies' version of limits on the patenting of
microorganisms is questionable, especially in the void of precedents for this
kind of "half-baked" protection. Except in the case of so-called
"use patents"—which the bill does not explicitly provide for—a
product is either completely patented or else completely in the public domain.
At the same time, how specific does "specific" have to be?
"Specificity" could be stretched to cover even the plant cells in
Grace's "species-specific" soy-bean or cotton patents, if we consider
plant cells as "microorganisms" and if we argue that the species
involved and also what differentiates a process for obtaining transgenic cotton
from processes for some other species make them both "specific"
enough to fit into these criteria.
2) WHAT IS A MICROORGANISM? The
"microorganisms" made patentable by Article 18, given the lack of any
clear definition, may include not only microorganisms in the classic biological
sense (bacteria, viruses, some or all funguses or algae, etc.) but also genetic
material, plant and animal cells, tissue cultures and even seeds. This is the
most likely result since the only reference for the INPI or the courts to use
in defining microorganisms is jurisprudence established in other countries.
Human cells used in industrial processes (to produce an enzyme-based drug, for
example) could easily be patented as microorganisms. Seeds used for the
production of plants would equally qualify (agriculture is explicitly
classified as an "industry" in the same bill's Article 15), and so
on, and so on.
Law Nº 9.279; May 14, 1996
SECTION I - PATENTABLE
INVENTIONS AND UTILITY MODELS
Art. 8. An invention
is patentable when it complies with the requirements of novelty, inventive step
and industrial application.
Art. 10. The following
are not considered inventions or utility models:
I - discoveries, scientific theories
and mathematical models;
II - purely abstract conceptions;
[...]
VIII - surgical techniques and
methods, as well as therapeutic or diagnostic methods, for use on a human or
animal body; and
IX - the whole or part of natural
living beings and biological materials found in nature, or even if isolated
from it, including the genoma or germplasm of any natural living being and
natural biological processes.
SECTION III -
NON-PATENTABLE INVENTIONS AND UTILITY MODELS
Art. 18. The following
are not patentable:
I - anything contrary to morality,
to ordre public and to public safety, order and health;
II - substances, materials,
mixtures, elements of products of any nature, as well as the modification of
their physical-chemical properties and the respective processes for obtaining
or modifying them, when resulting from the transformation of the atomic
nucleus; and
III - the whole or part of living
beings, except for transgenic microorganisms that meet the three requirements
of patentability - novelty, inventive step and industrial application -
provided by Art. 8 and that are not mere discoveries.
Sole paragraph - For the purposes of
this law, transgenic organisms are organisms, excepting the whole or part of
plants or of animals, which express, through direct human intervention in their
genetic composition, a characteristic not normally attainable by the species
under natural conditions.
CHAPTER III - THE
PATENT APPLICATION
SECTION II -
CONDITIONS FOR APPLICATION
Art. 22. The
application for a patent on an invention must refer to a single invention or to
a group of inventions that are inter-related so as to comprehend a single
inventive concept.
Art. 24. The report
must clearly and sufficiently disclose the subject matter, so as to allow it to
be performed by a person skilled in the art, and indicate, when applicable, the
best mode in which to carry it out.
Sole paragraph - In the case of
biological material essential to the practical performance of the object of the
application, which cannot be described as provided in this article and which is
not accessible to the public, the report shall be supplemented by the deposit
of the material in an institution authorized by the INPI or named in an
international agreement.
SECTION III - THE
PROCESS AND EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION
Art. 30. The patent
application shall be kept confidential for 18 (eighteen) months following the
date of its deposit or of the oldest priority, if applicable, after which it
shall be published, with the exception of the case provided for in Art. 75.
Paragraph 1 - The application may be
published earlier at the request of the applicant.
Paragraph 2 - The publication must
contain data which identifies the patent application, and a copy of the
descriptive report, the claims, the abstract and the drawings shall be made available
to the public at the INPI.
Paragraph 3 - In the case provided
for by the sole paragraph of Art. 24, the biological material shall be made
accessible to the public along with the publication provided by this article.
CHAPTER V - PROTECTION
GRANTED BY THE PATENT
SECTION I - RIGHTS
Art. 41. The extent of
the protection conferred by the patent shall be determined by the content of
the claims, as interpreted on the basis of the descriptive report and of the
drawings.
Art. 42. The patent
confers its owner the right to prevent third parties, without his consent, from
making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes:
I - the product which is the subject
matter of the patent;
II - the process or the product
obtained directly by a patented process [CCJ: subject to the provisions of Arts. 10 and 18]*.
Art. 43. The
provisions of the preceding article do not apply:
I - to acts carried out by
unauthorized third parties, in a private fashion and without commercial
objectives, as long as they cause no damage to the economic interest of the
patent owner;
II - to acts carried out by
unauthorized third parties, with experimental objectives, related to scientific
or technological studies or research;
III - to the preparation of
medicines following a medical prescription for individual cases, carried out by
a qualified professional, as well as the medicine thus prepared;
IV - to a product made in accordance
with a process or product patent which has been placed on the domestic market
directly by the patent owner or with his consent;
V - to third parties who, in the
case of patents involving living matter, use, without economic objectives, the
patented product as an initial source of variation or propagation in order to
obtain other products; and
VI - to third parties who, in the
case of patents involving living matter, use, put into circulation or market a
patented product that has been lawfully introduced into commerce by the patent
owner or by a license holder, as long as the patented product is not used for
the commercial multiplication or propagation of said living matter.
[CCJ: VII - to the components of patented transgenic microorganisms, once
transferred to or expressed in non-patentable living organisms, as provided by
Arts. 10 and 18.]*
TITLE VIII -
TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 229. Outstanding
applications shall be treated under the provisions of this Law, except for the
patentability of substances, materials or products obtained by chemical means
or processes, of food, chemical-pharmaceutical and medicinal materials,
mixtures or products of any kind, as well as the respective processes for
obtaining them, [CCJ: and for living
beings and biotechnological products and processes]* which shall be subject
to privilege under the conditions established by Arts. 230 and 231.
Art. 232. The making
or use, in the terms of the previous legislation, of substances, materials or
products obtained by chemical means or processes, of food,
chemical-pharmaceutical and medicinal materials, mixtures or products of any
kind, as well as the respective processes for obtaining them, even when
protected by a product or process patent in another country, in accordance with
a treaty or convention in force in Brazil, shall continue, under the same
conditions holding previous to approval of this Law.
Paragraph 1 - No retroactive or
future charges shall be allowed, in whatsoever value, for any reason, regarding
the products made or the processes used in Brazil in accordance with this
article.
Paragraph 2 - Charges such as those
provided for in the preceding paragraph shall equally be disallowed if, in the
period preceding the entry into force of this Law, significant investments have
been made for the use of a product or process referred to in this article, even
if protected by a product or process patent in another country.
* [Bracketed and italic text refers to amendments approved by the
Senate's CCJ on Dec. 7, 1995, but not by the CAE or by the Senate as a whole.]
The predominant opinion amongst the
members of Congress who voted to approve this law was that it would exclude at
least plants and animals from patentability. They were also convinced that the
nation's biodiversity would be protected from foreign usurpation, since natural
biological processes and products would also remain unpatentable (as
non-inventions). They are mistaken however, as many of them have already
recognized, now that the government is defending its "Cultivars Act"
as a necessary complement to patents on agricultural seeds for many of Brazil's
major crops.
These considerations, brought to the
fore by the Church, NGOs and others in debates in the Chamber of Deputies,
actually came to be important issues to right-, center- and left-wing
politicians in Brazil. The confusion surrounding what the new law actually
says, however, gives weight to the feeling of many members of Congress that
application of a law in these terms might not be exactly what the majority had
in mind. Enforcement will be a matter of interpretation: first by the
supplementary regulations to be established by the National Industrial Property
Institute (INPI) for its evaluation of patent claims and later—depending on the
INPI's interpretation—in the courts where suits may be filed by claimants or
others who feel prejudiced by official decisions.
Nonetheless, two areas regarding
biotechnologies and life forms in the newly-approved patent law are at least
much more restrictive than are the provisions in patent laws or court decisions
in industrialized countries, or even in other southern countries that have
changed their laws in recent years.
1) Natural
biological products and processes, first of all, are declared to be
non-inventions (art. 10/IX), and therefore not patentable, even when isolated
from their natural conditions, and specifically including their genoma or
germplasm.
It was also significant that item X
of this article was maintained, meaning that "surgical techniques and methods,
as well as therapeutic or diagnostic methods, for use on a human or animal
body" will remain unpatentable in Brazil under the new law. This issue was
not the subject of any heated political debate, but there were some crude
attempts in the Senate by the CAE's rapporteur (or his "aids" on the
behalf of pharmaceutical transnationals) to have this subject matter moved into
the category of "inventions".
2) PLANTS AND ANIMALS: Patents available
on living beings or biological material will be restricted to "transgenic microorganisms"
(art. 18/III and its sole paragraph) which express novel characteristics as the
result of direct human intervention in their genetic composition, and excluding
the whole or part of plants and animals. Presumably, patents will therefore not
be allowed on components of plants, animals or human beings, such as genes,
enzymes or proteins. (The qualifier "presumably" is used to indicate
a margin of doubt with regards to what the transnationals' lawyers will be able
to convince judges of in Brazilian courts.)
All of civil society's other
proposals to place limits on "life patents," however, were
unsuccessful. Some of the major points are briefly discussed here:
1) LIMITS ON WHAT IS "NATURAL":
Article 10 establishes no clear limit between
what is natural and what can qualify as an invention for living beings,
their components or the biological processes they carry out. It is conceivable,
for example, that in addition to "isolating" a biological molecule, a
company may simply crystallize the substance using conventional techniques and
then claim that it is an "invention." Even more significantly, any
"naturally occurring gene" transferred along with a promoter (as they
so often are in genetic engineering) to some other organism will be classified
(gene + promoter) as "novel," and therefore as an invention
potentially subject to a patent.
2) PATENTED TECHNOLOGIES, FREE GENETIC
RESOURCES: Since article 18 is the only place in the law that lists
non-patentable inventions, the absence of any mention of biotechnological processes in this article means that these
techniques will be patentable under the same terms as any other mechanical or
chemical process. This decision represents an act of political submission for
Brazil, because the Convention on Biological Diversity of which Brazil is a
full member (or "party") guarantees access to, and the transfer of these technologies – even
when patented – to countries that allow access to the genetic resources in
their national biodiversity (articles 15 and 16 of the Convention). The
Brazilian government's science and technology policy, however, placed absolute
priority on the patenting of foreign technologies, while never taking any
initiative at all to regulate terms for granting access to those resources (of
fundamental importance and value as raw materials in global biotechnology
industries). With the new patent law in effect, it will be very difficult for
Brazil to make any real use of biotechnologies to develop its own genetic
resources.
This has been one of the most hotly
disputed issues in international negotiations ever since the Biodiversity
Convention was still a promise. While the Convention's final compromise text
does oblige states to recognize intellectual property rights in this area, this
obligation is phrased in tandem with the requirement that (northern)
governments take measures to assure that "developing countries, which
provide genetic resources are provided access to and the transfer of technology
which makes use of those resources ... ." Brazil's new patent law makes no
provisions to this end, quite the contrary. The result may well be that the
genetic resources in Brazil's "unpatentable" biodiversity will end up
being prospected and developed exclusively for 20 years by those who now hold
patents on today's biotechnological processes (no Brazilians are known to be
amongst them) and by those who invent new processes to use these resources in
the future (with certainly few Brazilians amongst them, given the scrapping of
Brazil's R&D capacity under current "stabilization"-inspired
cutbacks).
3) "VIRTUAL" PATENTS FOR PLANTS AND
ANIMALS: Contrary to the belief of credulous members and leaders in
Congress who thought they were banning patents on plants and animals in article
18, the new law only forbids direct patents on plants and animals
as such, while purposely leaving the
door open for indirect patent rights on these higher organisms. There are two
means in the law for the creation of indirect (or "virtual") patents
over plants and animals. Amendments were approved by the CCJ commission in the
Senate which would have eliminated these "loopholes," but both were
removed by the rapporteur of the CAE in his January 1996 report, and never
again discussed.
First of all, patents on biotechnological processes for the creation of
transgenic plants or animals grant the patent owner the same rights over the
new plant or animal as they do over the process itself (art. 42/II). This means
that the company that patents the technology for splicing a gene into a plant
will be able to monopolize the transgenic plant too (even though the plant
itself is unpatentable), along with its seeds, components and products that
contain a gene spliced with that technology.
Secondly, there is no limitation (or
"exhaustion") in the law with regards to patents on genes from patented transgenic microorganisms, when
these genes are transferred or spliced into a plant or animal (an amendment was
proposed to art. 43 to create this exhaustion). Therefore, all unauthorized reproduction
of transgenic plants or animals will be forbidden, since this would also
necessarily imply the (illegal) reproduction of their patented genes. The
transgenic plants themselves remain unpatented, but the presence of patented
genes in their genomes places them under the same restrictions to free use as
would any patent.
One hypothetical example of a
virtual patent is a transgenic bacteria patented along with its
"novel" genetic components and used "in the process of obtaining
transgenic plants". The bacteria will no longer be present in the plants
obtained, but its patented genes will, and at each planting these genes will go
to work to reproduce a new generation of transgenic plants. All uses of these
supposedly unpatentable plants (in planting, breeding, processing or final
retail sale of products) could thus be subject to the rights of the bacteria's
patent holder. That's the way the patent system works, whether its subject
matter is mechanical, chemical or biological.
4) IMPACTS ON (VIRTUALLY) PATENTED SEEDS:
Article 43 confirms earlier fears regarding the absence of any "breeder's
exemption" or "farmer's privilege" regarding the use of patented
(or virtually patented) plants and seeds.
a) Item V of this article gives
breeders the right to use a directly or indirectly patented plant to obtain new
varieties, but only if the breeder has no "economic objectives." In
other words, all commercial results of the breeders' work will belong
exclusively to the person with patent rights over the initial variety and/or
its genes.
b) According to explanations given
by the bill's rapporteur in the Chamber of Deputies, item VI of article 43 is
intended to allow farmers to save patented seeds from their harvest, in order
to plant them back the next year. This in fact amounts to implicitly admitting
that plants (at least transgenic plants) indeed will be patentable. A closer look at the text, however, reveals
that even this right, or "privilege," need not be respected. Farmer
may freely use, distribute or sell the patented seed he/she has purchased, but
only "as long as the patented product is not used for the commercial multiplication or propagation
of said living matter." This means that the farmer cannot actually sell
the harvest from a second planting of seeds from the (virtually) patented
variety without obtaining the patent owner's consent, because the
"commercial multiplication or propagation" of plants is much more
far-reaching than the commercial production of seeds; it is what modern farming
is all about: planting, reaping and selling.
5) PIPELINE FOR BIOTECHNOLOGIES: Many
Brazilian scientists will lose the right to continue using the modern
biotechnologies on which important projects may depend. The impact of article
229, to paraphrase the text, is simply that outstanding
patent applications for patents on biotechnologies will be dealt with under the
provisions of the new law. The rest of the same article opens exceptions
for other sectors and technologies (drugs, chemicals, food) to continue their
free use of processes and products which only became patentable upon
publication of the new law. Articles 230-232 also elaborate on those
exceptions. But there is no exception for biotechnologies. (Again, an amendment
to this effect was passed by the Senate's CCJ, but rejected by the CAE.)
Shortly, many public laboratories currently using gene guns, PCR and other
techniques over which patents have been filed at the federal patent office
(INPI) in recent years, will have to start planning how to adapt to the new
law. They will have to negotiate and obtain specific licenses from the patent
owners, and include an item for royalties in their shrinking research budgets.
In addition, the law makes it perfectly legal for patent holders to demand
retroactive royalty payments for use of these technologies ever since they
first filed for protection. To make matters worse, the fact that all public
laboratories in Brazil are being pushed into "market-oriented"
research means that even the "scientific research exemption" in article
43/II will provide Brazilian scientists will little leeway to continue using
what have been public domain technologies in their work, except for
applications with no commercial value.
[1]Written in Rio de Janeiro for the project
"North-South Perspectives on Sustainability", coordinated by FASE
(Federation of Organs for Social and Educational Assistance), with the AS-PTA
(Consultants in Alternative Agriculture Projects), IBASE (Brazilian Institute
for Social and Economic Analyses) and PACS (Alternative Policies for the
Southern Cone); in collaboration with Milieu Defensie (FOE Holland) and with
funding from ICCO, NOVIB, OXFAM/UK and Bröt für die Welt.